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INTRODUCTION
When Richard Nixon invoked a national security prerogative to decide for
peace or war, to make and fulfill secret commitments for the nation, to
wiretap or break and enter, and to maintain absolute secrecy, he could refer
to twenty-five years of executive practice justified by the leading lawyers of
our time. Not surprisingly, the growth of executive power has been
rationalized by legal argument. Three primary doctrines-inherent power,
congressional delegation and post hoc ratification-have been employed within
the executive branch to justify executive initiative without legislative authority.
Although seldom reviewed and more rarely adopted in Supreme Court deci-
sions, these arguments provide the para-legal authority upon which broad
segments of the bureaucracy operate. Although Nixon's excesses have given
pause to the expansion of presidential prerogatives, continued assertions of
para-legal authority are inevitable, if only to justify on-going activities. This
paper uses a recent example of this assertion-the legal justification of covert
action by the Central Intelligence Agency-to outline somewhat mechanically
the logic and effect of the justification, and to comment on the limits of re-
form in such a situation.
The warfare bureaucracies, like the welfare agencies of the New Deal,
were the offspring of emergency, justified by necessity, that doctrine of "per-
nicious consequences," in the words of Justice Davis.' In both cases,
emergency became routine. Since the modern economy requires constant
tending by the state, the executive powers and agencies developed in response
to the Depression have become permanent features of the political landscape.
Similarly, the cold war made permanent place for the institutions and powers
developed to fight World War II. Indeed, belligerancy itself has become
routine. Since 1948, the United States has been involved in major crisis about
once every eighteen months-Greece, Iran, Korea, Lebanon, Guatemala, the
Congo, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Angola
-the list extends to every cranny in the world.2
An interventionist state must inevitably diminish the power of its legislative
body and increase that of the executive. Secretary of State Dean Acheson was
* Director, Center for National Security Studies, Washington, D.C.
1. Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2, 120-21 (1866).
2. See BARNET, INTERVENTION AND REVOLUTION I1 (1968).
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fond of quoting DeTocqueville's warning that "foreign politics demand
scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy . . .. [A
democracy] cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their conse-
quences with patience. These are qualities which more especially belong to an
individual or an artistocracy ' 3 or, in the United States, to an executive
bureaucracy. Thus in postwar United States the power of initiative, the ability
to set the direction and to marshal the resources of the society, passed to the
Executive. The notion that the President may act if not limited by Congress-
Theodore Roosevelt's "stewardship theory" writ large-is virtually unques-
tioned in areas of national security. The argument is rather over the Stuart
theory, summarized by Locke's description of the prerogative as "the power
to act according to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of
the law and sometimes even against it." 4
The growth of the executive branch naturally distorts its constitutional
roots. Legal authority for the executive initiative is not easily located in the
constitutional schema, or in the traditional beliefs and myths associated with
the Constitution. The very first premise of the founders was that the execu-
tive was subject to law, that the executive power is the power and duty to
execute laws passed by Congress. Yet, appeal to the law is desirable to even
the most powerful, for it provides a cloak of traditional authority for his ac-
tivities. Thus, over the years, executive spokesmen have recurrently, often
tenuously, asserted a legal authority for presidential initiative on the basis of
the inherent power of the President, by reference to some congressional stat-
ute, or by claim of congressional ratification. These doctrines, as Robert Nis-
bet has said, have been employed to justify "every conceivable degree of
power, stealth, and cunning.' 5
Not surprisingly, these arguments gained in popularity in the late forties
and fifties. The smouldering dispute between the Congress and the President
over executive privilege which dated back to the first years of the republic was
inflamed by the memorandum of Attorney General Rogers during the
Eisenhower Administration, which claimed for the President an "uncontrolled
discretion" to withhold information.6 The modern claim of a foreign policy
prerogative was grandly intoned, ex cathedra, by Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, who preached that the President's "authority to use the Armed
Forces in carrying out the broad foreign policy of the United States . . . may
not be interfered with by the Congress in the exercise of powers which it has
under the Constitution."17 Hannah Arendt noted that Eisenhower was the last
3. Quoted in D. ACHESON, PRIVATE THOUGHTS ON PUBLIC AFFAIRS 55 (Harvest Book ed. 1955).
4. Quoted in E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 112 (Chase & Ducat
ed. 1973).
5. R. NISBET, TWILIGHT OF AUTHORITY 31 (1975).
6. See Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 UCLA L. REV. 1034, 1045 (1965).
7. Quoted in S. REP. No. 606, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1972).
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President to believe that the initiation of a war required prior consent of
Congress. 8 The New York Times revealed that the first 150 years of the re-
public witnessed 799 treaties and 1,182 executive agreements; the next
twenty-six featured 368 treaties and 5,590 executive agreements, with 400 ad-
ditional covenants secreted even from the Congress. 9 The FBI traces its in-
ternal security and wiretap powers back to an executive order by Franklin
Roosevelt, which was renewed by President Truman."'
Taken together, the three legal doctrines provide an opportune post facto
justification for executive actions initiated essentially without concern for the
limits of law. They provide the para-legal rationale for ongoing bureaucratic
activity. The President is said to have residual powers in the area of foreign
relations. The scope of these powers is not defined, but mav be divined from
"the gloss which life has written" on the Constitution.'' Repeated presidential
acts may establish a new inherent power in the Chief Executive of constitu-
tional dimension, a claim which Raoul Berger has termed "adaptation by
usage.'1 2 Alternatively, ongoing bureaucratic activities are said to be ratified
by the Congress if it votes appropriations, even if initially unauthorized. Fi-
nally, broad or vague language in congressional authorization statutes may be
pieced together to provide a peg of legal authority on which to hang execu-
tive programs. All three justifications condone and even encourage executive
initiative without concern for legal limits or authority.
Our recent experience with Vietnam and Watergate provides tragic tes-
timony to the dangers posed by this reasoning. Widespread belief in raison
d'etat fosters actions which trample the bounds of the Constitution. Some of
its worst effects are felt in the law itself. Increasingly, law becomes viewed as
voluntas, the mere whim of the powerful. The national security bureaucracies
increasingly act for the purposes of the state, assuming that the law presents
no limitation. Within the bureaucracy, legal authority is the mere will of the
President, or the orders of a bureaucratic superior. Only to outside queries-
to the citizenry, the courts and the Congress-are traditional legal doctrines
sent to the lists. Para-legal justification may thus represent a transitional form
between the rule of law and the reign of a leader. Clearly the removal of
constitutional restraints paves the way for decisionism, the acceptance of po-
litical decisions no natter what their content as long as sufficient power stands
behind them.
To be more concrete, bureaucratic programs and actions operate upon the
8. H. ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 21 (1969).
9. New York Times, May 1, 1972, at 32. col. I.
10. SENATE SELECT CONMM. TO STum' GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG.. IST SESS., FINAL REPORT. Book II '22 (1976).
11. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 597, 610 (1952) (Frankfurler, J., con-
curring).
12. Berger, War-Mlaking bl the Presidentt, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29, 54 (1972).
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legal opinions of lawyers within the executive branch. Seldom do these asser-
tions come within the purview of the courts or raise the ire of the legislature.
Thus, the internal papers of executive "house counsel" are of great "legal"
effect, for activities cloaked with the authority of the state proceed on their
authority. Executive attorneys are expected to find authority for activities, not
restrain them. The development of legal justifications thus provides a veneer
of legality for executive initiative. I would argue that the repeated (often cyni-
cal) employment of such doctrines slowly erodes the concept of law as sepa-
rate from will, both procedurally (the legislature must empower) and substan-
tively (there are constitutional limits which must be obeyed). Moreover, after
twenty-five years of such practice, reconstitution and reform are most dif-
ficult.
The continuing., post-Watergate usage of such doctrines is best illustrated
in the recent Cispute over the Central Intelligence Agency and its covert ac-
tion programs abroad. The CIA's distinguished outside counsel, Mitchell
Rogovin, filed a brief with the Senate and House Select Investigating Commit-
tees which advanced the three archetypal justifications for executive initiative
in defense of covert action abroad.13 The importance of the subject, the ex-
emplary nature of the arguments, and the reputation of the author make the
brief itself worthy of perusal.
I
THE CIA's COVERT ACTION: THE LAW AS A CLOAK
"Covert Action" is the bureaucratic eu)hemisn for clandestine operations,
beyond the gathering of intelligence, which are designed to influence the in-
ternal affairs of other nations. Richard M. Bissell, Deputy Director of Plans
between 1958 and 1962, provided the following typology of covert action to a
private briefing sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations in 1968:14
The scope of covert action Could include: (I) political advice and counsel: (2)
subsidies to an individual: (3) fiiancial support and "technical assistance" to
political parties; (4) support of private organizations, inIcluding laboi unions.
business firms, cooperatives, ctc.: (5) covert propagancla: (6) "private" training
of individuals and exchange of persons: (7) economic operations: and (8)
Patalnilitaiv [ol] political action operations designed to OVeCi thi,)w o to sup-
)ort a regime (like the Bav of Pigs and the programs in L.aos). These opera-
lions can be classified in varioius wvays: by the degree ad type of secre\
reqfuliired, by theii legalityN and, perhaps, by their benign or hostile character.
In the balder language of criminal law, covert action would encompass
bribery, forgery , libel and slander, arson, mayhem and conspiracy to commit
13. Heorings Bfore the House Select Comm. on Intelligence. 94th Cong., 1st. Sess., Part 5, 1729-38
(1976) (hereinafter cited as Rogovin Nlemorudum).
14. Quoted in J. MARKS AND V. IARCHETTI, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE 387
,(1974).
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a range of felonies, including kidnapping, murder, riot and insurrection. The
CIA's activities range from day-to-day manipulation to sponsoring and direct-
ing clandestine armies in Laos and Angola.
As Senator Frank Church has suggested, "[tjhe legal basis for this political
action arm of the CIA is very much open to question."' 5 Inspection of the
Agency's legislative charter and its legislative history provides not a word
about covert action. Legal authority was not of great concern until the wide
range of CIA illegalities and abuses received publicity. In recent debates over
the CIA, critics and defenders of the agency have sought to enlist the law as
an ally in the political struggle. The Rogovin Memorandum represents the
most comprehensive effort of the CIA to locate a legal basis for covert action.
The memorandum canvasses three "fundamental sources" of legal authority,
"each of which, in itself, constitutes a sufficient legal basis for the dele-
gation." The three include (1) "the inherent constitutional power of the Presi-
dent;" (2) congressional authorization; (3) congressional ratification."I
A. Inherent Power
Although the precursor of the expanded national security powers of the
President was the developing corporate economy and the corresponding
growth of welfare and regulatory powers, a broad claim of "inherent power"
is rarely made in domestic affairs. Even in emergencies, Presidents have gen-
erally sought some legislative authorization before acting. 7 Truman's experi-
ence in the Steel Seizure case indicates judicial sensitivity to a claim of presiden-
tial prerogative at home.'
Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown, defined a twilight
area in which the President may act in the absence of congressional
pre-emption.' The theory provides a charter for doing "anything that the
needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Con-
stitution or by the laws." 2 " From this right of initiative developed the claim of
"adaptation by usage," that a long-term practice by the President establishes
an inherent power to act, even-say advocates of its most extreme form
-against a later congressional limitation. The courts have justifiably been
chary about accepting the argument for, literally interpreted, it would
place the Chief Executive beyond control of the Congress and the courts. The
15. Church, Covert Action: SUampland of American Foreign Policy, transcript of speech before the
Pacern in Terris IV Conference, Washington, D.C., December 4, 1975.
16. Rogovin Memorandum at 1729.
17. But see United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U,S. 459 (1915).
18. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 597 (1952).
19. See Corwin. The Steel Seizure Case: A judicial Brick Without Straw, in ESSAYS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 257 (R. McCloskey ed. 1957).
20. T. ROOSEVELT, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, quoted in E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND
POWERS, 1787-1957: HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF PRACTICE AND OPINION 153 (4th rev. ed. 1964)
(hereinafter cited as CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT).
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theory provides a favorite argument by executive spokesmen; it is used inter-
nally to justify practices initiated without authorization, and externally to im-
pede restrictive congressional legislation. The constitutional merits of the doc-
trine have been debated extensively elsewhere. 2' The opinion of the Court in
Powell v. McCormack provides a curt rejoinder: to a congressional claim that
Rep. Powell's exclusion was supported by long practice, the Court replied,
"[t]hat an unconstitutional action has been taken before surely does not ren-
der that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date. " 22
The power of the President to engage in covert action abroad will not, of
course, be located in the enumerated powers assigned the Chief Executive in
the Constitution, nor will it be supported by the debates of the founders or
the decisions of the Supreme Court. The Rogovin Memorandum predicates
an inherent power for covert action upon the "President's broad powers with
respect to the conduct of foreign affairs." The President's broad powers are
established by passing reference to judicial dicta and historical quotations.
That these powers encompass covert action is proven by appeal to the "over-
whelming historical precedents.12
3
Beginning with Marshall's general statement that the "President is sole
organ of the nation in its external relations," the Memorandum skips down
the well-trod path of excerpts from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Report of 1816 and Mr. Justice Sutherland's dicta in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corporation.2 4 Although the Supreme Court has never consid-
ered the question directly, the Rogovin Memorandum suggests that the
Court would uphold the President's inherent right "to direct an agency of
government to perform covert action abroad," having made it clear that the
President has the right to conclude binding executive agreements, 2 5 to use
military force abroad to protect United States citizens, 26 and to repel an
armed attack by meeting "force with force.1
27
Review of the authorities cited in the Rogovin Memorandum to establish a
broad presidental power over foreign affairs is not necessary here. 28 Even
21. Compare Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 833
(1972) with Berger, supra note 12.
22. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969).
23. Rogovin Memorandum at 1731.
24. Id. at 1730-31.
25. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
26. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
27. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
28. Marshall's address was concerned with the President's right to represent the country in
foreign affairs, being responsible for receiving Ambassadors and carrying on negotiations. The
same is true of the Senate Report. Curtiss-Wright involved, as Justice Jackson noted in Youngstown,
"Not the question of the President's power to act without congressional authority, but the ques-
tion of his right to act under and in accord with an Act of Congress...." 343 U.S. at 635-6; the
rest is dicta. See generallyv Berger, The Foreign PolicV Powers of the President, 1 MicH. L. REv. 1
(1972). In re Neagle involved the President's police power at home, not the war power abroad. See
generally Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique, 60 CAL. L. REV. 623 (1972).
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assuming expansive powers, it wxoulld be difficult to invent a practice more
foreign to the Constitution than routine covert intervention in the internal
affairs of other countries. The Rogovin Memnorandumns invocation of inher-
ent power thus rests almost entirely on the "overwhelming historical prece-
dents."
What is the evidence of a traditional practice so accepted as to place the
"gloss of life" on the Constitution? The Rogovin Memorandum cites two areas
of experience. First is the "longstanding practice whereby Presidents, acting
on their own authority, have dispatched troops to foreign countries and au-
thorized the use of military force short of war. 29 In this regard, the
Memorandum cites the hoary list of 125 instances compiled by the Library of
Congress in 1920. "It would logically follow." the Memorandum concludes,
that the President therefore has the power to "send civilian personnel to
foreign countries to engage in covert action. ' "
The War Powers Resolution of 1973 indicates that any presidential inher-
ent power to dispatch troops abroad can at least be regulated by the
Congress. 3' Of the 125 incidents, the "great majority were for 'the simple
protection of American citizens in disturbed areas,' and only about a third
involved belligerent action.''32  Whatever their magnitude, all also had one trait
in common: they involved uniformed military, acting overtly on orders of the
President (or lesser military commanders). Not one involved the covert use of
civilians to disrupt the internal affairs of another country.
The second line of precedlents is invoked to remove this distinction. Virtu-
ally every President has appointed "special agents . . . to perform what has
come to be known as covert action ... to engage in certain activities with or
against foreign countries ....... In the first century of the nation alone, the
Memorandum reports, more than 400 of such were appointed by the
President.34 Still, the conclusion is drawn that this practice is so "deeply
rooted" that historians have acknowledged the "existence of a broad presiden-
tial discretion with respect to appointment of such agents and assignment of
functions to them." '3 5 And in support, the Rogovin Memorandum cites Henry
Merritt Wriston's seminal study, Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations .36
But Wr iston's sttidv itself' provides the proper tonic for the heated conclu-
sions of the Rogovin Menoranldum. \7riston concludes that. tc]ontrarv o
29. Rogovin lemorandum at 1731.
30. Id. at 8.
31. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (Supp. IV 1974).
32. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, at 437 n.83.
33. Rogovin Memoradim at 1732.
34. Id. Also cited are two congressional reports, both of which are also cited by Wriston, infra
note 36.
35. Id. at 1733.
36. H. WRISION, EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN AIMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1929) (hereinafter
cited as WRISTON).
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general belief, the amount of 'secret' service in American diplomacy is rela-
tively small. ' 3 7 He presents a handful of examples which include the three
cited in the Rogovin Memorandum. What of the 400 agents in the first
hundred years or the "legion" of precedents cited in the Memorandum?
These refer to special agents selected by Presidents to represent them abroad.
Wriston gives them two general characteristics: they are agents of the Presi-
dent rather than officials of the government-"They have an employment,
not an office"; their duties are generally special and temporary a. 3
The "characteristic situations" in which special agents have been used in-
clude: "ceremonial occasions;" to speak for the President personally; interna-
tional conferences and delegations (the "most prolific" source); contacts with
unrecognized states; technical matters requiring a high degree of expertness.
In effect, then, the Rogovin Memorandum would have us consider the dis-
patch of Chief Justice Warren to DeGaulle's funeral as a precedent for covert
action. In contrast, however, Wriston himself concludes that "episodes in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could be adduced, but they would be
rare, and, for the most part, not significant, and certainly not typical .... ,,39
This is the longstanding practice from which the Rogovin Memorandum
would derive a constitutional power for the President to employ a secret
agency in widespread covert operations abroad. More than a difference of
degree reaching a difference in kind, it is rather a simple form of sophistry to
justify this dangerous agency on the basis of an inapposite tradition. The tor-
tured logic of the Memorandum was not forwarded without reason, however.
The CIA traces its birth back to an executive order issued by President
Roosevelt in 1941, establishing the Office of Coordination and Information in
the White House. Roosevelt issued the order four months before Pearl Har-
bor on the basis of "the authority vested in me as President of the United
States and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States. .",41 Eleven months later, OCI became the Office of Strategic Ser-
vices, a transformation directed by "military order," and OSS undertook both
clandestine intelligence collection and para-military operations (covert action)
throughout the war.4 '
In 1945, OSS was disbanded by executive order, but four months later
President Truman established the National Intelligence Authority and the
Central Intelligence Group by a "Presidential Directive" issued without any
proclaimed basis in law. The directive authorized the CIG to plan, develop
and coordinate "such other functions and duties related to intelligence affect-
37. Id. at 693.
38. Id.
39. Wriston, The Special Envov', 38 FOR. AFFAIRS 219, 226 (1960).
40. Roosevelt, Letter of July 11, 1941, 3 C.F.R. 1324 (1938-43 Comp.).
41. See generally R.H. SMITH, OSS (1972).
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ing the national security as the President . . . may from time to time direct."42
Thus, the CIA's immediate forbearers were established by executive orders is-
sued in peacetime. Although the CIG reportedly had no covert action arm,
the Rogovin Memorandum claims, for reasons discussed below, that it did
engage in such activities. Only some notion of inherent power can legitimate
this activity post facto. The Rogovin Memorandum seeks to legitimate this an-
cestry by inventing a birthright in inherent power.4"
B. Authorization and Delegation
The primary source for the expansion of executive power has been the
sweeping delegations of power made by Congress in the passage of broad and
vague statutes. Although receiving frequent judicial tribute in dicta, the con-
stitutional doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative power, as Elihu
Root noted as early as 1916, "has virtually retired from the field and given ip
the fight. .'144 This is true particularly in foreign affairs; Curtiss-Wright was
(or should have been) a delegation case, and Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion
has been cited for the proposition that "Congress-in giving the Executive
authority over matters of foreign affairs-must of necessity paint with a brush
broader than it customarily wields in domestic areas .... ,,4. Vague legislation
combined with the demise of the delegation doctrine has practical effects. The
congressional intent in a statute-other than an intent not to set policy-is
difficult to divine for either an administrator or a court sitting in review. The
very scope of the authorization, as well as the authority to act within the
scope, is often unclear.
Often executive agents define not only policies which come under a legis-
lative commission, but also the meaning and scope of the commission itself.46
For all branches of the government, and for the citizenry, agency practice
provides the predominant definition of the legislative grant. In the social wel-
fare and regulator), agencies, this power is bounded to some degree by ad-
ministrative law, the system of formalized public rule-making and internal
due process, which Congress can review if it chooses. 47 In the national secu-
rity bureaucracies, secrecy limits oversight, and as the next section will show,
42. Presidential Directive of Jan. 22, 1946, 3 C.F.R. 1080 (1943-48 Conp.).
43. The decision not to seek legislation was made, according to Bernard Gladieux, who drew
up the papers in 1945, in part because, "Congressional mood was such that it wouldn't even have
gotten out of committee." Bernard Gladieux, Interview with David Klaus, Washington, D.C., Ma\
19, 1975, Notes on file at Center for National Security Studies. Washington, D.C.
44. Quoted in K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 36 (2(1 ed. 1959).
45. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
46. Compare Alexander Hamilton: "A delegated authority cannot alter the constituting act ....
An Agent cannot new-model his own commission .... " Quoted in Berger, supra note 12 at 57
(emphasis deleted).
47. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); Jaffe, AN
ESSAY ON DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1947).
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formal bureaucratic procedures often do not apply. Additionally, executive
officers assume far greater license in national secLrityv matters. In this area,
the legal process quickly becomes inverted. Instead of a congressional charter
commissioning executive practice, the latter begins independently, and ad-
ministration attorneys search out a possible legislative basis, treating the Fed-
eral Code as a clothing store of authority, in which different laws may be tried
on at will. The Rogovin Memorandum, reflecting the claims of Central Intel-
ligence Agency spokesmen, represents an extreme example of this inversion.
The Central Intelligence Agency was established formally by the National
Security Act of 1947.48 The Act briefly otItlined the functions of the new
agency-coordination, development and analysis of intelligence. The charter
contains no explicit authority for either the collection of intelligence or for
covert action abroad. Clause (5) of Section 102(d), the "other functions"
clause, authorizes the agency "to perform such other functions and duties
related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security
Coutncil may from time to time direct." 4" It is this clause which agency
spokesmen claim authorizes covert action abroad. The clause was adopted vir-
tually verbatim from the 1946 Truman executive order establishing the Cen-
tral Intelligence Group, as was the entire CIA charter." It was generally as-
sumed that the Central Intelligence Agency would perform the functions
previously discharged by the CIG.
The Rogovin Memorandum argues that the House Committee on Ex-
penditures in Executive Departments, with "full knowledge of the broad im-
plications of subparagraph (d) of the 1946 Presidential Directive, conferred
identical powers and responsibilities on the CIA," including "a broad range of
operational assignments." 5 I "Operational assignments" in the CIA lexicon
sometimes includes both covert action and human intelligence collection (es-
pionage), and sometimes refers only to espionage. Its definitional flexibility is
used frequentlx to obscure and impedle outside oversight efforts.5 2 The Rogo-
\'in Memorandum claims that the CIG was involved in covert action abroad,
that the House Committee and Congress knew this, and that the "fifth func-
tion" clause encompassed it. All three propositions are confounded by the
record.
CIG was an interim agency, a "short-term pip-squeak thing," noted Arthur
48. Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified at scattered sections of 5, 10, 31 and 50 U.S.C.
but largely repeated).
49. 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
50. Initially the National Security Act contained a section stating that the CIA Would under-
take all the functions contained in Presidential Directive of Jan. 22. 1946. 3 C.F.R. 1080 (1943-48
Comp.). The House Committee demanded a spelling out of the functions.
51. Rogovm Memorandum at 1735.
52. See Wise, Covert Operations Abroad: An Overview, in THE CIA FILE (Borosage & Marks ed.
1976). 9-10.
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Macy Cox, a former employee of both CIG and CIA.5 3 There is no historical
evidence that CIG had any covert action programs. Cox and Lawrence Hou-
ston, General Counsel of the CIA for over twenty years, both stated that the
CIG has no such projects.5 4 In both the House and the Senate, CIG was de-
scribed in public record as a coordinating and analytical agency. There were
rare and passing references to intelligence collection; covert action was not
mentioned.
55
The same descriptions were provided for the proposed functions of the
CIA in the public hearings of the House and Senate-scattered reference to
intelligence collection, no mention at all of covert action.5 6 The Rogovin
Memorandum quotes an exchange between Representative Brown and Lt.
General Hoyt Vandenberg, then Director of Central Intelligence, as authority
for imputing congressional knowledge of and intent to authorize covert ac-
tion. The Memorandum fails to indicate that the exchange took place in ex-
ecutive session, the minutes of which are classified to this day.5 7 With a private
store of material from which to quote selectively, the Memorandum pub-
lishes the following exchange:58
Rep. Brown: "[T]his other section (i.e. subparagraph (d)) was so broad that
you could do about anything that you decided was either advantageous or
beneficial, in your mind?"
Lt. Gen. Vandenberg: "Yes, sit."
Rep. Brown: "In other words, if you decided you wanted to go into direct
activities of an\' nature, almost, why, that could be done?"
Lt. Gen. Vandenberg: "Within the foreign intelligence field, if it was
agreed upon by all of the three agencies concerned [i.e., State, War and
Navy, the three agencies represented on the NIA]."
Vandenberg limits his response to "the foreign intelligence field," and it must
be so limited, for otherwise the quote would be authority for "activities of any
nature, almost. In fact, the exchange referred only to the covert collec-
tion of intelligence. Walter Phorzheimer, legislative counsel with the OSS,
53. Interview with David Klaus, Washington, D.C., January 20. 1975, on file at the Center for
National Securitv Studies, Washington, D.C.
54. Interviews with David Klaus, Washington, D.C., April 10, 1975, on file at the Center for
National Security Studies, Washington, D.C.
55. Indeed, Allen Dulles was concerned by the public debate that the CIA might not receive
authorization for espionage. In a letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Dulles wrote
"Having this conception of the task . . .I am skeptical as to the wisdom or adequacy of the
provision in the bill .... These provisions seem to me to set up what, in effect. is likely to become
merely a coordinating agency for military intelligence services .... This is useful . . . but it is not
enough." Dulles, Memorandum Re: Section 202, Legislative History of the CIA, (1975: Congres-
sional Research Service) CRS-46.
56. Id. passim.
57. A recent attempt to gain access to the minutes was rebuffed by both the House Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Office of the Special Counsel of the CIA. A Freedom of
Information Act request is still pending.
58. Rogovin Memorandum at 1734.
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CIG, and CIA, stated that Vandenberg testified in executive session about
intelligence collection, because Army Intelligence (G-2) was opposed to the
CIA undertaking any collection activities. According to Phorzheimer, covert
action was not mentioned. 5" Lawrence Houston, who drafted the 1946 execu-
tive order, stated that the policy within the administration was "completely
unclear" about covert action, and the fifth function clause was to "leave a
door open" in case of the "unforeseen.""t The first director of the CIA, Ad-
miral Roscoe Hillenkoetter stated he had no interest in covert action, and
intended the CIA to be purely and "intelligence outfit."6 ' The language of the
fifth function clause itself, as well as the entire public legislative record may
be taken at least as easily against, as for, the notion that Congress intended to
authorize covert action in 1947.
Essentially, the Rogovin Memorandum reflects the CIA's post facto justifi-
cation of covert action on the basis of its 1947 Charter. The "fifth function"
clause was used by administration officials to justify establishing covert action
without a return to Congress.6" The argument of the Memorandum raises
other questions which need not be pursued here. Even assuming congres-
sional intent, what an extraordinary delegation is here! Can it be constitution-
ally permissible for Congress to delegate the authority to "undertake such
other functions related to intelligence affecting the national security," and
ranging in practice from bribery to attempted assassination to secret warmak-
ing, thus trespassing on the congressional war power? Creation of a clande-
stine agency for covert intervention abroad is a perilous venture for a republic,
as we have witnessed in recent days. At the very least, it is one of "these im-
portant subjects" which Congress must clearly determine.6"
C. Ratification
When the President undertakes an action that may lawfully be done only
by Congress, Congress may legitimate the act by explicit justification after the
fact. "4 The doctrine of ratification applies both retrospectively and prospec-
tively, legitimating the past and authorizing a continuation. It is often em-
ployed to justify the acts of administrators acting under general grants of
power in social welfare agencies.6 5 Obviously the doctrine sanctions unau-
thorized initiatives, which may then receive a later ratification. In the national
security area, the President has frequently claimed ratification by appropria-
59. Interviews, spr-i note 54.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Wise, supra note 52 at 6-7.
63. Wayman v. Southand, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 41-2 (1825).
64. See Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U.S. 111 (1947); Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354 (1941).
65. Id.
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tion acts, a position accepted by some circuit courts reviewing the Vietnam
War.
6 6
Generally the courts require an "explicit designation": an appropriation
act "must plainly show a purpose to bestow the precise authority which is
claimed. 61 7 The rationale for the requirement is clear: Executive branch ap-
propriations are passed in comprehensive bills. The requirement insures that
ratification will receive individualized attention, and thus represent a policy
judgment of the Congress upon which a court may justifiably rely.
The Rogovin Memorandum presents two separate ratification claims for
covert action. For the first, the Memorandum adopts the position of a 1962
Justice Department paper which concluded that continued appropriations
combined with periodic reporting about covert action to selected leaders in
the Congress constitutes ratification: "The Congress as a whole knows that
money is appropriated to the CIA and knows generally that a portion of it
goes for clandestine activities, although knowledge of specific activities is re-
stricted. 68
The Rogovin Memorandum cites Brooks v. Dewar as authority for the
proposition that, under these conditions, Congress has "effectively ratified the
authority of the CIA to plan and conduct covert action. " Brooks involved
a challenge to a licensing scheme established by the Secretary of the Interior
under a statute delegating broad responsibility of cattle-grazing districts to
him. Although the licensing scheme was not explicitly authorized, the court
found congressional ratification of the Secretary's activity. First, the court
ruled that "[t]he information in the possession of Congress was plentiful .... ,,70
It cited annual reports of the Secretary, reported testimony at Appropriations
Committe hearings, and testimony on the floor of Congress. Second, the
court found that the "repeated appropriations of the proceeds of the fees
thus covered, and to be covered, into the Treasury . . . constitutes a ratifica-
tion of the action .... 71
Compare the Brooks standard with the CIA's practice. The CIA's annual
budgetary figures are secreted in the defense budget. Even the gross sum is
not revealed to members of Congress, a practice itself of doubtful con-
stitutionality.72 Generally, only a handful of senior legislators on appropria-
tions subcommittees in each house are privy to some breakdown of the fig-
ure. No annual reports are issued by the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. No open hearings and few floor debates review the activities of the
66. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (lst Cir. 1971).
67. Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 303 (1944).
68. Rogovi Memoiirdm at 19.
69. Id.
70. 313 U.S. 354. 360-61 (1941).
71. Id.
72. See genieially Note. The CIA's Seciet Fu,,dine and the Cmistitution, 84 YALE L. 1. 608 (1975).
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CIA. Clearly after 1960, legislators knew or should have known about the
CIA's covert action capability, but that was far removed from the information
available on cow-pasture licensing in Brooks. Moreover, no "explicit designa-
tion" was or could be made, for the Congress never voted on a CIA budget,
much less one for covert action. The Justice Department brief cited by the
Rogovin Memorandum dismisses this impediment:
73
Since the circumstances effectively prevent the Congress from making an ex-
press and detailed appropriation for the activities of the CIA, the general
knowledge of the Congress, and specific knowledge of responsible committee
members . . .are sufficient to render this principle [ratification] applicable.
Since explicit designation is inconvenient, it is not necessary. Secret appropria-
tions are thus to have greater probative value than public ones in determining
congressional ratification. Lewis Carroll might have got on well in this day.
Finally, in its second claim of congressional ratification, the Rogovin
Memorandum comes to rest on a clear and concise authority. In the wake of
revelations about the "de-stabilization" of Chile in December 1974, the Con-
gress passed the Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.71
The relevant section provides that "no funds appropriated under any act may
be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations
in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining neces-
sary intelligence," unless the President finds that each such operation is "im-
portant to the national security," and "reports, in a timely fashion a descrip-
tion" to the appropriate committees of the Congress.7 5 "Ironically," reported
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, "the only clear Congres-
sional authorization for the CIA to conduct covert activities resulted from an
attempt to limit those activities."7 6
The Ryan Amendment graphically illustrates the congressional dilemma
posed by unauthorized executive initiatives: the attempt to limit an unchar-
tered practice is transformed into an authorization for it. Thus, the War Pow-
ers Bill is said to legitimate presidential war-making; 7  the Freedom of In-
formation Act to authorize the classification system;7 8 the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act to recognize national security wiretapping.79
Congressional inaction may be claimed as evidence of an "inherent" ex-
ecutive power; congressional action generally co-opts it into ratifying the very
73. Rogovin Memorand m at 1736.
74. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 663, 22 U.S.C. § 2242 (1970).
75. Id.
76. Committee on Civil Rights and the Committee on International Human Relations, Associ-
ation of the Bar of the City of New York, The Central Intelligence Agency: Oversight and Accountabil-
ity 15 (1975).
77. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (Supp. IV 1974).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. IV 1974).
79. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970).
PARA-LEGAL AUTHORITY
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
practice it attempts to limit. Two factors reinforce this dilemma. First, unau-
thorized activity continued for any length of time develops bureaucratic and
corporate interests which are politically potent. The CIA is perhaps the classic
example, but executive branch practice in classification and international
agreements reveal similar dynamics. Second and more important, routine un-
authorized activity creates a new reality principle which is most difficult to
ignore or repudiate. Congress will virtually always seek to limit rather than
eliminate a routine executive activity, no matter how pernicious.
The Ryan Amendment illustrates the potency of the new reality created by
unauthorized activity. The amendment can offer no satisfactory definition of
covert action, except those activities performed by the CIA "other than those
activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence."8" The category
of covert action is defined in terms of the bureaucratic practice. Thus the
Ryan Amendment constitutes perhaps the ultimate delegation: post hoc ratifi-
cation for anything the CIA undertakes other than intelligence collection.
Given the CIA's history-most of which was secret from the Congress-this
could include anything from petty bribes to assassination attempts and secret
wars. Given the language of the statute, it could include anything which the
President found "important to the national security," which could be under-
taken by the CIA through direct or indirect expenditures. The final reduction
of law to decisionism occurs here: the law is defined by presidential decision,
and the authority of the legislature can be cited as authorization.
II
THE DISORDER OF THE SECRET BUREAUCRACY
The rather widespread acceptance of para-legal justifications for executive
initiative undermines respect for legal authority in ways we are only now com-
ing to understand. From the first, the growth of regulatory agencies created
concern about the rule of law. Elihu Root reflected both the fear and the
response in 1916:81 "If we are to continue a government of limited powers,
these agencies of regulation must themselves be regulated .... The rights of
citizens against them must be made plain. A system of administrative law must
be developed... ." Administrative law, through the devices of formal rule-
making procedures, adjudicatory hearings, due process guarantees, and over-
sight, calmed many of the fears created by the domestic agencies.8 2 However
much we may deplore the inherent despotism of "petty, narrow, rigid and
illiberal" bureaucracy, with its "little men clinging to little jobs and striving
towards bigger ones," the system of administrative law has at least provided
80. 22 U.S.C. § 2242 (1970).
81. Quoted in K. DAVIS, supra note 44 at 12.
82. Certainly not all: Many commentators agree that the growth of "substantive law' has
greatly contributed to loss of authority in this country.
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the minimal protection of regularity, due process, and Weberian rationality to
the social welfare and economic bureaucracies. 83
The same is not true for the national security agencies. The CIA's internal
operations do not follow even Weberian principles of rational legal authority.
Recent revelations indicate that the CIA is far from unique in this regard;
virtually every intelligence agency reviewed by the Congress is similarly pat-
terned. Behind the veil of official secrecy, the CIA and other agencies have
operated above the law.
Thus, executive agency officials essentially created their own commission.
At the first meeting of the National Security Council in December 1947, the
NSC issued a top secret directive authorizing the CIA to conduct covert oper-
ations. From 1955 to 1970, the basic authority for covert action was a revised
and secret NSC Directive: NSC 5412/2. Defining covert operations as "any
covert activities related to propaganda, economic warfare, political action (in-
cluding sabotage, demolition, and assistance to resistance movements)," the
directive instructed the CIA to counter " 'International Communism' through-
out the world." ' In 1962, the CIA's General Counsel, Lawrence Houston,
rendered an internal opinion that the Agency's activities were "not inhib-
ited by any limitations other than those broadly set forth in NSC 5412/2. '85
Early agreements with the Justice Department insured that domestic law need
not be of concern; the CIA was given a prior check on any criminal investiga-
tions concerning CIA officials or agents.8
Initially, the internal decision-making and review structure for covert ac-
tion was informal and ill-defined. In 1955, a formal structure was established.
The Special Group, a subcommittee of the National Security Council, was
chartered, and to this day this subcommittee (now called the 40 Committee) is
responsible for reviewing and approving proposed activities.
The Assassination Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
concluded, however, that "[a]uthorization procedures . . . have not always
been clear and tidy, nor have they always been followed."8 7 A 1967 internal
CIA memorandum characterized procedures from 1955 to 1963 as "somewhat
cloudy and . . . based on value judgments by the DCI (Director of Central In-
telligence)." 8 Indeed, we now know that the DCI decides which projects of the
CIA are submitted to the 40 Committee, and only about one-fourth are sub-
83. Robert Michaels and Max Weber Iuoted in R. NISBET, supra note 5 at 54, 58.
84. Quoted in S. REP. No. 465, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 9 (1975) (hereinafter cited as ASSASSINA-
TION REPORT.
85. Id.
86. The agreements are spelled out in an exchange of correspondence between Justice and
the CIA in 1948, on file at Center for National Security Studies, Washington, D.C.
87. ASSASSINATION REPORT at 10.
88. Id.
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mitted.8" Moreover, the Senate Committee has reported that 40 Committee pro-
cedures feature "fuzzy" criteria for evaluation, "inadequate consultation," and
review which is not "searching or thorough. " '
The existence of formal procedures has not eliminated the use of informal
ones. The Senate Committee reports that, "formal procedures may be disre-
garded by either high Administration officials or officers in the CIA." 91 Thus,
when President Nixon gave CIA Director Richard Helms what was, according
to the Senate Report, a virtual "carte blanche" to block Allende's accession to
power in Chile in 1970, he instructed Helms not to consult with the members
of the 40 Committee, nor to inform the Ambassador in Chile." 2 In the con-
tinuing plots to assassinate Castro involving underworld figures, CIA officials
decided not to inform either the "Special Group" or a new CIA director, John
McCone, about their activities.
9 3
"Informal" procedures were reinforced by the practice of compartment-
alization-internal secrecy--within the CIA. The Senate Committee traces
this to the doctrine of "plausible denial", which, initially limited to taking
measures to protect the United States and government officials from identifi-
cation in the event of exposure of a covert operation, was soon used internally
to "mask decisions of the President and his senior staff members." The Senate
Report notes, "a further consequence of the expansion of this doctrine is that
subordinates, in an effort to permit their superiors to 'plausibly deny' opera-
tions, fail to fully inform them about those operations." 4
This practice included more than the use of aesopian language in conver-
sations between the President and his agents. One effect was that many orders
were issued orally rather than in writing. The Senate Report quotes an
anonymous official involved in the assassination plots: "I don't think Vou are
going to find a piece of paper for everything that this Agency or any other
Agency has done. There are lots of things that get done by word of mouth
.... ,,95 Indeed, written orders often are a misleading "paper trail," designed
as cover for "plausible denial." When shown a damaging memorandum com-
posed by Lawrence Houston, CIA General Counsel, General Marshall S. Car-
ter, Deputy Director of the CIA in 1962, noted that "memorandums (sic) for
the record have very little validity in fact."9 "
Two incidents portray the atmosphere in which CIA officials work. In Oc-
tober 1960, Michael Mulroney, deputy director of an 'extremely secret unit in
89. SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLI-
GENCE ACTIVITIES, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., COVERT ACTION IN CHILE 41 (Comm. print 1975).
90. Id. at 42.
91. ASSASSINATION REPORT at 10.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 11.
95. Id. at 316.
96. Id. at 107.
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the Directorate of Plans" (Clandestine Services), was asked by Richard Bissell,
at that time Deputy Director of Plans, to go to the Congo and assassinate
Lumumba. :' Mulroney testified that he refused the assignment. After a sec-
ond discussion with a persistent Bissell, he met with Richard Helms, at that
time Bissell's deputy, and informed Helms that he refused to take the assign-
ment. Mulroney testified about his motivation: "[I]n the Agency since you
don't have documents you have to be awfully canny and you have to get
things on the record.""'8 The oral exchange was to protect Mulroney. For
Helms, of course, the exchange might be seen as an attempt to create a rec-
ord of refusal to cover actual participation (Mulroney did proceed to the
Congo). Alternatively, it could be seen as an attempt to force responsibility
back to Bissell. Helns asked no questions, knowing it was not his place to
know the truth.
The second example is illustrated by the CIA's failture to destroy deadly
toxin poisons in direct violation of a formal treaty, and presidential directive.
As Morton Halperin has elaborated, obviously not all treaties are intended to
apply to the CIA. The Rio Pact which pledged non-interference in the inter-
nal affairs of hemispheric nations was not interpreted as a restraint on the
CIA. When the President directed the destruction of the poisons, Helms re-
ceived no special order to obey the directive. He might thus have assumed
that he was not intended to obey (and might well have received a secret oral
indication to that effect). Helms testified that he ordered his subordinates to
destroy the poison, but no written order was issued. The subordinate had the
same task as Helms: he had to divine if the oral order was meant to be
obeyed or was simply pro forma (assuming it was actually issued), giving the
subordinate responsibility for preserving the poison and bearing the blame if
exposed."'"' In this context, CIA officials operate not in a defined office upon
written procedures with clear guidelines like a public bureaucracy, but upon
what Senator Baker called "a common web of perceived authoritv," fulfilling
what the\, interpret to be the intentions of their sttperiors.11
" "i
The obvious plrodluct is the widespread assumption that the CIA is to op-
erate above the law. CIA officials are outraged at suggestions that the "de-
stabilization" of the Allende government was illegal because it violated United
States treaties. " ' The treaties simply do not constitute legitimate authoritv.
Similarly, when asked whv he continued the mail opening program for twenty
years despite an explicit criminal statute prohibiting mail tampering, the di-
97. Id. at 38.
98. Id. at 39.
99. Halperin, CIA: Denying W that's Not in 1'iriting, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 4, 1975 at 11.
100. ASSASSINATION REPORT at 319.
101. See, e.g.. Statement of fornier CIA official Tom McCoy at Center for National Security
Studies Conference on Controlling the Intelligence Agencies, November 4, 1975. Washington,
D.C., transcript on file at CNSS.
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rector of the CIA Counterintelligence Staff replied plaintively, "I find it in-
conceivable that a secret intelligence agency of the government has to comply
with all the overt orders of the government.' 2 Michael Mulroney testified
that after refusing Bissell's request that he assassinate Lumumba, he asked
whether such plans were not a "conspiracy to commit murder . . . in the
District of Columbia" and "in violation of federal law." Bissell "airly dis-
missed" this prospect.1
1 3
A 1954 document composed by a special presidential committee illustrates
the prevalent view: it called for "an aggressive covert psychological, political
and paramilitary organization far more effective, more unique, and, if neces-
sary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy...." In the new
"game", "[t]here are no rules .... Hitherto acceptable norms of human con-
duct do not apply . . .long standing American concepts of American fair play
must be reconsidered . . 104
This pervasive contempt for law and "fair play" was accompanied by
another sensibility, less noticed in the recent revelations. Repeatedly CIA offi-
cials would display an awareness of the illegality or illegitimacy of their acts,
which reinforced their furtiveness. Thus, extraordinary m issions-assassina-
tions, domestic surveillance, poison toxins-were undertaken outside of the
chain of command, with oral orders and special secret task forces, whose ac-
tivities were secret even from the Inspector General's office."15 When Richard
Helms provided Kissinger with "Restless Youth", a CIA study, on the student
movement at home and abroad, he emphasized in a cover letter: "This is an
area not within the charter of this Agency, so I need not emphasize how ex-
tremely sensitive this makes the paper. Should anyone learn of its existence it
would prove most embarrassing for all concerned.""'" Thus, also the constant
concern with the "flap potential" of the mail project, leading the CIA's In-
spector General to recommend preparation of an "emergency plan," and
"cover story." 107
I suggest this demonstrates a recognition of the legal authority, if only in
its conscious breach. Weber notes that "a thief orients his action to the validity
of the criminal law in that he acts surreptitiously.'" 8 In many ways, the be-
havior of the CIA parallels that of a gang of thieves. Beneath the disdain and
presumption was at least an expedient concern for law. This sensibility may
102. Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intel-
ligence Activities, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 2, Houston Plan (1975) (hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings).
103. ASSASSINATION REPORT at 39.
104. Id. at 259, n.1.
105. But ad hoc secret groupings were normal fare within the CIA.
106. COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
134 (1975).
107. Id. at 107.
108. M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAl. AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (T. Parsons ed. 1964).
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well have provided the prinary check on CIA officials for "even in the cases
of . . .deliberate disobedience to these prescriptions, the probability of its
being recognized as a valid norm may have an effect on action."'(,!
To a great extent, ideological zealotry-the fervent anti-communism of the
Cold War-provided absolution for violations of law or "fair play." Morals
were not at stake in what Dean Rusk called the "back alleys" of the world; will
and manhood were. And yet the high church catechism of anti-communism
could not withstand the heresy of Vietnam externally or of detente internally.
The CIA's secret charter reflects the change: The basic authority of CIA
covert action is now National Security Decision Memorandum 40, which
superseded NSC 5412/2 on February 17, 1970. NSDNI 40 describes covert
actions as programs designed to further official United States policies abroad;
it. makes no reference to communisUm. 1 t With absolution unclear, it is not
surprising that internal dissention grew. When James Schlesinger asked em-
ployees to forward information on any programs they considered illegal, he
received over 500 pages in response.' At the same time, Agency officials
began to leak damaging information to the press, and one-by-one the 'family
jew els" were revealed.' 12
The para-legal operation of the CIA also has grave implications for the
society's respect for law. The government, wrote Brandeis, "for better or for
worse, is the great powerful teacher of its citizens.''' a One shudders to con-
sider the lessons drawn from an Agency revealed to have engaged in assassi-
nation attempts, coups and secret wars. Because of the Agency's close connec-
tion with the criminal underground, William Colby had to deny reports that
the CIA "rubbed out" Sai] Giancana-a reputed Mafia chief-and his denial
was widely disbelieved. The Agency operates like a conspiracy, engages in
conspiracies, and represents a view of intervention and political power which
is based upon conspiracy, manipulation and terrorism. One may greatly fear
for a polity which so instructs its citizens. And the CIA is but a particularly
seamy lesson in the course of instruction provided by a series of presidents,
culminating in the televised downfall of Richard M. Nixon.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing has direct implications for the current period of reform
and debate. For years the national securLix apparattis operated with the gen-
eral approval of the Congress and the people. Locke long ago remarked that
109. Id. at 125.
110. ASSASSINATIiON REPORr at 9. n.3.
I11. The Washington Post. \Iar. 8. 1975, at A9., Col. I.
12. The connection between loss of authorit atnd leaks is crucial. The CIA is now demand-
ing Official Secrets legislation for the first tine in its history, seeking to bolster faltering In purpose
with legal sanctions.
113. Olmstead v. United States. 277 U.S. -139. 485 (1927).
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"the people are very seldom or never scrupulous or nice in the point of ques-
tioning the prerogative whilst it is in any tolerable degree employed for . . .
the good of the people and not manifestly against it."1 4 The Vietnam War
and the Nixon impeachment have spawned the furious pace of congressional,
intellectual, journalistic and legal investigations of the presidency; like Caliban
we suddenly rail at our image in the presidential mirror. The general assump-
tion is that the "imperial presidency" must be brought under the limits of law,
a conclusion shared even within the bureaucracy. Asked by the Senate Com-
mittee why the CIA's mail intercept program was discontinued in 1973, How-
ard J. Osborn, former Director of the CIA's Office of Security replied, "It
came to the attention of a lot of people in the light of Watergate that the
government shouldn't be doing anything illegal."' 11 Legislative authority is
sought and reform not greatly resisted for an entire range of national security
practices and institutions. Even CIA Director William Colby has announced
that: l11
Intelligence is American; it is being brought under our Constitution . . . The
work of the Senate and House Committees . . . is the process of bringing
intelligence within our constitutional framework. It can be done, it will be
done by better guidelines, by better supervision, and by a continued effort to
keep it doing the things we Americans want it to do...
Colby's statement outlines the accepted parameters for reform. The intel-
ligence agencies will receive new legislated charters with "strengthened" con-
gressional oversight and presumably new reporting requirements. The War
Powers Resolution,'1 7 the Freedom of Information Act,' 1 8 the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act," '" and the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 197412 " will be supplemented by legislation on
the intelligence agencies and on surveillance techniques. The general model
will be the same: an attempt to limit executive license through reporting and
oversight requirements.
It strikes me that the limitations of this process will raise serious problems
for legal authority. As the Ryan Amendment demonstrates, the congressional
reforms are not likely to reflect a perspective greatly different than that of
existing executive practices. It is not likely that covert action abroad will be
abolished; or that the FBI's Charter will prohibit political intelligence
gathering.' 2' Although some limits will no doubt be drawn-no assassination
114. Quoted in E. CORWIN, siipra note 4 at 112.
115. Senate Hearings, supra note 102, Vol. 4, Mail Opening (1975).
116. Transcript, National Town Meeting, National Public Radio, December 11, 1975, 3.
117. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (Supp IV 1974).
118. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. IV 1974).
119. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970).
120. Pub. L. No. 93-344. 88 Stat 297 (codified at scattered sections of 1, 2 and 31 U.S.C.,
Supp. IV 1974).
121. H.R. 6051, introduced by Rep. Heroan Badillo and eighteen other legislators, would
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by the CIA or character assassination by the FBI-the legislative charters will
probably ratify the vast bulk of executive practices. Nor should this surprise:
more extensive reform would require a worldview divorced from the imperial
perspective, and Congress simply does not represent that different view yet.
The attempt to "bring these agencies under the Constitution" will be lim-
ited to giving a Weberian orderliness to their activity. Of course even this
effort is limited by the secrecy and license necessary to imperial policing.
122
The primary limitation will be congressional reporting and oversight. Over-
sight gives a handful of representatives, acting for the Congress, a seat behind
the executive curtain of secrecy, but on the condition that they only watch the
plays, not choose which shall be performed or reveal the plot to outsiders. At
present, congresspersons are enjoined from informing even their colleagues
about the briefings given to them in Executive Session. Through legislated
charters and oversight, the authority of Congress will be invoked to legitimate
the on-going practices of the President. A section of the Congress will be
folded into the executive branch, and separated from the public by official
secrecy.
These representatives will face the struggle over legitimacy in concrete
situations. Inevitably, they will review performances which violate their sen-
sibilities or seem to impinge on the constitutional role of the legislature, viz.
the secret war in Angola. They will individually be forced to choose between
silent acquiesence (or secret remonstration which is the equivalent) and viola-
tion of their secrecy vows to speak out or leak out information. The tribula-
tions of Rep. Michael Harrington, who revealed the CIA's "de-stabilization" in
Chile suggest that few will choose the latter course." 3 If they choose not to
object publicly, however, they provide congressional legitimation for decisions
made in secret within the executive branch, eroding the public policy-making
function of the Congress.
With Congress-and inevitably the courts-ratifying and legitimating ex-
ecutive national security activities, I would suggest that the underlying author-
ity of the law will be called into question. A constittution is more than its literal
legal text. It is intertwined with a myth and belief structure which establishes
and external system of values. Our Constitution is closel' bound to the liberal
theory of the law: It must be procedurally rational-publicly made by elected
representatives and applied equally to all; and substantively limited-that gov-
ernment is the neutral arbiter, watching the interests of all, protecting them
make the necessary reforms, but its chances for passage are minimal. See H.R. 6051, 95th Cong..
1st Sess.
122. Neuman distinguishes between public bureaucracies which follow "fixed and ascertain-
able" rules and private bureaucracies which follow "secret instructions." The latter tend to serve
"egoistic group interests." The CIA is a private bureaucracy with governmental power. See F.
NEUMAN, BEHEMOTH: THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM, 78-79 (1942).
123. Harrington faced censure hearings before the House Ethics Committee: the motion was
dismissed on a technicalit'.
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from infringement by the few or the many. Obviously, social welfare and
economic legislation departed from this mythic source of authority. As sug-
gested above, the development of administrative law bridged the gulf in part.
In the national security area, however, the departure will not be so easily
remedied. National security practices-even if authorized by proper pro-
cedural authority-violate basic constitutional values: that major policy deci-
sions be publicly debated, that the state not act through private bureaucracies,
that executive officials act according to law. Additionally, the daily activities
themselves inherently violate widespread American norms, designedly so. The
CIA's proudest moments, for example, involve large secret bribes to fix the
outcome of supposedly free elections in Italy and France after World War
11.124 It seems likely that "cleaning up" these activities by legislative charter
will serve not to legitimate the activities but to undermine the authority of the
law. Deeply felt notions of fairness and justice may be turned against the
constitutional systein which sanctions their violation.
Legislative charters will also not remedy the adverse example which the
government will offer its citizenry. Among a growing percentage of the popu-
lation, the CIA, FBI and military are considered lawless instruments of the
President. They are burlesqued in cartoons, condemned in polemics, the per-
sonification of evil and corruption in novels and films. In all organs of our
culture, CIA is used as a shorthand for the devious and corrupt. Legitimation
of covert action will inevitably contribute to the paranoia and conspiracy fears
of the citizenry. Political movements will adopt similar methods of secrecy and
terror; a dialectical process whi1ch may have deterred the CIA from seeking
legislative sanction earlier in its existence. Terrorism breeds counter-mea-
sures, creating the wretched spiral of repression and rebellion. In the end,
the law itself will be politicized, and as Franz Neumann has written. '125
"'When it becomes political, justice breeds hatred and despair among those it
singles out for attack. Those whom it favors, on the other hand, develop a
profound contempt for the very value of justice: they know it can be pur-
chased by the powerful."
An alternative possibility exists, of course. The national security bureau-
cracles can be brought within the limits of the republican constitution, not b'
legal legerdemain, but with a Luirposeful withdrawal from an imperial role
abroad. There is a positive consciousness which provides the basis for this
transformation. An entire segment of the politically active in this country ma-
tured not during the Cold War but in the anti-war movement, not in McCar-
thyite purges but in civil rights struggles. Their political motion-combined
with the increasing difficulty of enforcing our order abroad-may provide the
basis for a reconstitution of authority in this country.
124. See ChUttCh, supra note 15, for a similar view.
125. See Neuman. suprI note 122 at 23.
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